By Yoseph Mulugeta Baba (Ph.D.)*
Part VI
(Note: One has to read all my previous articles to fully understand the current one!)
In line with Hountondji, Kwasi Wiredu’s critical work, Philosophy and an African Culture, depicts African philosophy as a folk thought. Unlike the former, however, he does not entirely dismiss African culture. Rather, he calls for the critical interpretation of culture in accordance with contemporary African experience. According to Masolo, for instance, “Wiredu’s view on ethnophilosophy is moderate in comparison with the views of Towa and Hountondji.” (Masolo, 1994, p. 204) Appiah also rightly contends that “for Wiredu there are no African truths, only truths – some of them about Africa.” (K. A. Appiah, 1992, p. 104).
Yet, keeping the universality and unquestionable value of scientific rationality in mind, Wiredu categorically criticizes the “ethnophilosophical” school. Above all, he dismisses Senghor’s famous saying on epistemological expression: Emotion is black as much as reason is Greek. (K. Wiredu, 1980, p. 12) He views such an assertion as unscientific and baseless, which is deprive it of having philosophical value. “The truth, then, is that rational knowledge is not the preserve of the modern West, nor superstition a peculiarity of the African.” (Ibid. 42-43). Meaning: Africans as well as Europeans can be rational, and European (or others who are not African) can be superstitious. What Wiredu insists on is that modern philosophy should be different from traditional philosophy. As Ochieng-Odhiambo points out, “as milieu changes so too must philosophy. In this regard, part of Masolo’s observation, on those philosophers who are seeking to revive and reinstate the traditional African philosophy as the suitable philosophy for Africa today, is appropriate.” (Ochieng-Odhiambo, 2010, p. 97; also see D. A. Masolo, 1994, P. 225.) Wiredu argues that: “With that distinction made it is of importance to try to understand how each mode of thought, and especially the traditional, functions in the total context of its society. Since African societies are among the closest approximations in the modern world to societies in the pre-scientific stage of development, the interest which anthropologists have shown in African thought is largely understandable. However, instead of seeing the basic non-scientific characteristics of African traditional thought as typifying traditional thought in general, Western anthropologists and other besides have mistakenly tended to take them as defining a peculiarity African way of thinking, with unfortunate effects.” (See K. Wiredu, 1980, p. 39; also see Helmut Danner, 2012, p. 84)
Despite Wiredu’s valuable contribution in the development of African philosophy, his view has criticized for serving Eurocentric interests. To begin with, Messay dismisses Wiredu’s philosophical position stating that:
Instead of blaming tradition, Wiredu should have asked how the universal rationality of science got involved in such activities as colonialism and slavery. Is not the involvement devious enough to challenge the absolute value and truth invested in scientific rationality? In addition to showing that the Cartesian project to become master and possessor of the world is not universally valid, one of the merits of the philosophy of negritude is the suggestion that there is a connection between the scientific audience of the West and its war-driven and racist ethos. (Messay, 2004, p. 117)
Messay is quite right as Wiredu fails to observe the intrinsic aggressiveness of Western culture in regard to Africa, which is nothing other than the refusal of the Otherness. (Ibid) Hence, Oyenka Owomoyela’s stand against Wiredu can be justified his saying that “a true African philosophy would aim at reconciling Africans to Africanness, not at advocating dissolution in a European cultural mélange.” (Oyenka Owomoyela, 1991, p. 178)
Above all, Wiredu’s reduction of philosophy to argument should also be rejected. It is a big pitfall to claim that the essence of philosophy is nothing other than argumentation and clarification. In his critique of Wiredu’s definition of philosophy, Joseph Omoregbe contends that “the essence of philosophy is not argument but reflection, and this does not have to take the form of Western-type argument. Whenever there is a reflection on the fundamental questions about man or about the universe (whatever form this reflection takes) there is philosophy.” (Joseph Omoregbe, 1998, p. 5)
Another critic of “ethnophilosophy” is Marcien Towa. “He doubts that the preoccupations of the ethnophilosophers are properly philosophical.” (Imbo, 1998, P. 30) Though fully agreeing with Hountondji, as far as the rejection of “ethnophilosophy” is concerned, Towa’s view of the recovery of past knowledge is very different. According to Messay, “for Towa, a traditional African philosophy has existed, but it need not be recovered for the simple reason that it was utterly worthless.” (Messay, 2004, P. 88)
Here, what Towa is propagating is nothing other than a denial of the legitimacy of the African past as a source of grasping African philosophy with the intent of superimposing Western qualities of mode of thought on all philosophy. This is what Irele explicitly states of Towa that the latter “calls for renunciation of the self as constituted by the Africans past is an opening out to new perspectives of thought and action, self-alienation in the positive Hegelian sense. This aspect of Towa’s thinking is given direct expression in his advocacy of Western philosophy as the only intellectual method capable of leading to the transformation of Africa.” (Abiola Irele, 1983, P. 26)
As Masolo interprets:
For Towa, European philosophy reached its highest points in modern times. He thinks of Enlightenment thought in general and particularity of philosophy conceived in the manner of Hegel or in the manner of Descartes, Bacon, Galileo, Hobbes, and others in earlier modern times, that is, philosophy which has a close relationship with science, as lying at the origin of European power. It is the secret of their victory over other peoples. (Masolo, 1994, P. 168)
However, Towa’s argument is inconsistent as many flaws can be identified. In the first place, his contention should be dismissed as far as his view of that of past tradition must be rejected is concerned; for the simple reason that his argument is an indication of the African alienation. Masolo is quite right when he criticizes Towa’s position that:
As far as philosophy is concerned, however, the method proposed by Towa doesn’t seem to us to be the only or the most adequate solution. The dogmatic retention of Marx’s stress on the mode of production as the key to understanding historical development creates a barrier through which it is difficult to see some of these authors’ creative work. And there seems to be an illegitimate extension and application of Marx’s social theory to cover all aspects of human life.
The relevance of traditional methods of knowledge in the context of modern patterns of living is to be dictated by the empirical needs and the living patterns of contemporary society. It is this attitude toward the traditional past that underlies the philosophical thoughts of such people as Peter Bodunrin, Kwasi Wiredu, Henry Odera Oruka, among others, in their versions of anti-ethnophilosophy. (Ibid., 172, 177-178)
Hence, it is baseless to claim that the rejection of knowledge of the traditional past is essential. Kwame Gyekeye, for instance, dismisses the criticisms of “professional” philosophy in general when he contends that:
There is, strictly speaking, no such thing as “collective” thought, if this means that ideas result from the intellectual production of a whole collectively. What has come to be described as “collective” thought is nothing but the ideas of the individual wise people; individual ideas that, due to the lack of doxographic tradition in Africa, became part of the pool of communal thought, resulting in the obliteration of the differences among these ideas, and in the impression that traditional thought was a monolithic system that does not allow for divergent ideas. (K. Gyekye, 1987, p. 24)
Hence, in contradistinction to what Towa baselessly claims, it is impossible to dismiss even the works related to “ethnophilosophy” as a whole. Hebga has pointed out that “ethnophilosophical” literature “represents the whole of truths which is our system of reference and is therefore of capital importance in the understanding of the mechanism of our thought: it is the traditional lore made of history, legends, social, moral, and religious laws, of more or less developed techniques and of customs, with the whole based on a metaphysics that guarantees it its unity.” (M. Hebega in Masolo, 1994, 174) Hence, Towa’s assertion is nothing other than an implicit propagation of the superiority of Western scholarship.
In line with other “professional” philosophers, Fabien Eboussi-Boulaga also rejects “ethnophilosophers’” definition of African philosophy. He, for instance, states that Tempels’ interpretation of vital force is nothing other than the paradox whose ontological system is “entirely unconscious and is expressed in an inadequate vocabulary without coherence.” (Masolo, 1994, P. 148) Therefore, Eboussi-Boulaga argues for the rejection of the method of “ethnophilosophers” whose method affirms the negation of the negation of the self. Contemporary African philosophers, he suggests, must detach themselves from a desire to justify the Western myth about Africa. For Eboussi-Boulaga, the school of “ethnophilosophy”, argues Masolo, is a violent movement “that has separated the world into two groups -the dominant and the dominated, the master and the slave.” (Ibid, P. 159)
After all, Eboussi-Boulaga’s critique of “ethnophilosophy” does not hold water. Of all, he fails to reveal the true essence of what academic philosophy ought to be. It is one thing to dismiss the “ethnophilosophical” school as pseudo-philosophy. It is, however, quite another thing to able to explain and establish the true nature of academic philosophy in accordance with the historical and ontological origins of philosophy. I will strongly assert that most of the attacks on African philosophy are aimed at the wrong target. To say the least, it would be absurd to argue for or against the nature and method of African philosophy before one clearly defines as well as explains the very nature of philosophy itself.
Unlike the foregoing critics, Odera Oruka’s philosophical position is quite different. He holds that “ethnophilosophical” views do not meet the Universalist criteria for a critical enterprise of philosophy. Yet, his critical work (H. O. Oruka, 1990, Passim) unequivocally identifies philosophic sages, as opposed to folk sages, in traditional Africa. According to O. Oruka, philosophic sages have been capable of rational critiques of their culture without the benefit of writing or having had contact with European ideas. As Ochieng-Odhiambo has correctly observed:
In philosophic sagacity the position is that, even in traditional Africa there are individuals who are capable of critical, coherent and independent thinking. Philosophic sagacity therefore retains the basic principles of the professional philosophy. However, unlike the professional school, philosophic sagacity is an exposition of the beliefs and wisdoms of individuals who have not been “corrupted” by Western education and imbibed its cognitive systems. (Ochieng-Odhiambo, 1010, P. 120)
Lansana Keita, however, criticizes not only the method with which “ethnophilosophers” deal with data. He also dismisses philosophic sagacity itself. (Keita, 1985, PP. 145-161) In line with Hountondji, he strongly insists on the importance of writing African philosophy. Unlike Towa, but like Masolo, (Masolo, 1994, P. 233-246) he rightly observes that the incorporation of traditional African thought systems in the practice of contemporary African philosophy is legitimate and necessary.
However, Keita’s criticism of philosophic sagacity is dismissed by Odhiambo on the grounds that philosophic sagacity cannot be reduced to “ethnophilosophy”. (Ochieng-Odhiambo, 2010, P. 126-129) Odhiambo’s rejection of Keita’s contention seems right based on N. Kaphagawani’s argument that “ethno-philosophy is premised on the holistic assumption whereas philosophic sagacity sets out from the assumption of non-holism.” (Kaphagawani, 1990, P. 187)
Peter Bodunrin’s criticism of sage philosophy, (Bodunrin, 1991, PP. 63-68) on the other side, also dismissed by Odera Oruka himself (H. O. Oruka, 1983, PP. 383-393) on the basis that philosophic sagacity is fundamentally different from other works of “ethnophilosophy”. Therefore, the latter ironically criticizes Bodunrin’s view that “to be authentically philosophical, Africans must be unAfrican.” (Ibid, 193)
The European denial is much more fundamental than what Prof. Bodunrin formulates. It denies to Africans not just the “existence of a tradition of organized critical reflections on the thoughts, beliefs and practices of their people”, it denies the possibility for a serious reflection of any kind, i.e. for any critical use of reason. In other words, the African or black man is claimed to be incapable of any serious rational discourse. (H. O. Oruka, 1990, P. 45)
This might be one of the reasons why Sophie B. Oluwole defended Oruka’s position on sage philosophy. She argues that his mission of surveying sage philosophy should be continued and also academically encouraged. (S. B. Oluwole, 1997, P. 149) “While it may be true that professional philosophers may continue to remain ignorant of the philosophy of the sages because their opinions are not written, this does not unconditionally establish the claim that traditional African sages cannot, and do not philosophize.” (Ibid, P. 157)
The legitimacy of philosophic sagacity can be understood more fully if one thoroughly explores the philosophic position of Kwame Gyekye. Despite his Universalist approach, Gyekye argues that “the fact that philosophy takes off from experiences that may be said to be a specific to cultures or historical situations does not necessarily detract from the universality of (some) philosophical ideas, arguments, proposals, or conclusions.” (Gyekye, 1997, PP. ix) As he correctly affirms, the important aspects of traditional practices and knowledge in modern Africa, Gyekye’s criticism of Hountondji and Towa is quite right; for the latter two fail to clearly identify the positive and negative aspects of every human culture. Culture, according to Gyekye, should be neither completely relied on nor rejected in its totality.
It seems to me that those confusions and inconsistencies and ambivalences stem from the failure to delineate or distinguish between what may be regarded as positive and negative features of African culture. (Every human culture has both positive and negative elements.) It is this failure that leads the revivalists to collapse the two features of the culture into something entirely positive-valuable, while leading the antirevivalists to collapse them into something entirely nagatively–worthless. (Ibid, P. 237)
Having this in mind, Gyekye carefully sees how to interpret the African traditional modes of thought not only in accordance with our modern times, but also as these relates to a particular society. For instance, he rejects John Mbiti’s African concept of time as being universal among African cultures on the grounds that such baseless thought cannot and should not be applied to all African societies. According to the latter’s view, in the African conception of time, there is only a two-dimensional phenomenon: zamani and sasa, that is, a long past and a present moment, respectively. Simply put:
One main principle underlying Mbiti’s conception of African philosophy, is what he terms “the African conception of time”. This conception is contrasted with the western conception of time. In the West time is linear consisting of three phases: past, present and future. In Africa, as a contrast, Mbiti argues, time consists of two phases, past and present. The future element is almost non-existent. He asserts that Africans hardly conceive of future beyond two to three years. (H. O. Oruka, 1990, P. 8)
The conclusion is: An infinite future is foreign to the African mode of thought.
In contradistinction to Mbiti’s philosophical approach, Gyekye, however, maintains that: “My objection is to Mbiti’s generalization of a concept derived from just two local African languages to the whole of the African peoples…,I am asserting that the identity or similarity of such conclusions cannot be assumed without having investigated the other languages.” (See See P. English and K. M. Kalumba, 1996, 95)
In a similar vein, research undertaken among the members of some ethnic group of Africa by Odera Oruka demonstrates the existence of a tradition of prophecy. This, in turn, contradicts Mbiti’s notion of the African concept of time, whereas it affirms Gyekye’s philosophical position. “The mere existence of prophets in traditional Africa does invalidate any theory for the non-conception of future.” (H. O. Oruka, 1990, P. 9)
Ivan Karp and D. A. Masolo also offer a moderate criticism against “ethnophilosophy” due to “two contrary aspects. It is a critical discourse that defines itself in opposition to colonialism. Yet, it starts by accepting the colonial categories of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’.” (I. Karp and D. A. Masolo, 2000, P. 6) This is one of the reasons why they call “for sustained empirical investigation of African cultures” especially in the (post) colonial context research, which has already been started by Odera Oruka, Hallen, and Sodipo. (For more detail see Hallen and Sodipo 1995 or 1986, Passim)
Hallen and Sodipo and Odera Oruka represent the “Africans as philosophers” approach, although here, too, the aims and methods of each are strikingly different. Odera Oruka relies entirely on interviews and adduces his own criteria for discriminating between the conventionally wise those he calls “sage philosophers,” while Hallen and Sodipo take naturally occurring discourse of Yoruba diviners as their units of analysis. (I. Karp and D. A. Masolo, 2000, P. 14)
The long and short of it is that almost all “professional” philosophers have totally or partially rejected the methodology that “ethnophilosophers” employ in their discourses on African philosophy. As such, they typically view “ethnophilosophy” as a “debased” form of philosophy. To say the least, most of contemporary African philosophical discourse has revolved around the ideas of members of these two contesting parties.
(to be continued)
Note: The responsibility for the articles is entirely mine.
Galatoomaa!
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* Yoseph Mulugeta Baba received his B.A; M.A; and Ph.D degrees in Philosophy from the CUEA. His research areas include Metaphilosophy, Oromo Philosophy, Continental Philosophy, Post-colonial African Political Philosophy, Postmodernism, and Ethiopian historiography. His book, entitled: “Metaphilosophy or Methodological Imperialism? The Rationale for Contemporary African Philosophy with Reference to Oromo Philosophy” is forthcoming (CUEA PRESS). He can be reached at kankokunmalimaali@gmail.com.
