By Yoseph Mulugeta Baba (Ph.D.)*
Part V
Having established a solid foundation in Oromo Concept of Reality or Dhugaa-Ganama (see my previous articles), I would like to explicate and show how an ilaa-fi-ilaamee-philosophic-mode-of-thought can be used to overcome the problem of methodological imperialism and a feudalistic approach to truth. In so doing, I shall demonstrate the way in which an ilaa-fi-ilaamee-philosophic-mode-of-thought not only serves as a philosophic method of enquiry, but also gives critical direction regarding a baseless criticism leveled at African philosophy. Simply put, the ilaa-fi-ilaamee philosophic method of enquiry intends to create the critical conditions for the termination of the present-day academic methodological fabrication or methodological imperialism which propagates pseudo-epistemological assumptions, assumptions that have unfortunately become stumbling blocks in most contemporary African scholarly investigations. Hence, based on the ilaa-fi-ilaamee philosophic method of enquiry, I am going to expose and to destroy a set of some damaging and pseudo-epistemological assumptions of metaphilosophy and other methods of intellectual disciplines as a sine qua non for authentication of academic African philosophy and a critical interpretation of (post) colonial African conditions. In this manner, I will propose a rationale for using the ilaa-fi-ilaamee method of doing contemporary African philosophy — with some reference to (post)colonial African philosophical discourse. Simply stated, I will propose an alternative methodological approach to contemporary philosophical discourse in general, and state the rationale for such a method of conducting African academic philosophy in particular. I will also show how contemporary African scholars, irrespective of intellectual disciplines, should utilize an ilaa-fi-ilaamee-method-of-enquiry to overcome the problem of EXTREMISM/RADICALISM as an alternative scholarly approach in framing contemporary African academic discourses both to identify the problematic issue and determine a viable philosophical/scientific solution to the case in question. As it will be shown, the ilaa-fi-ilaamee method of enquiry justifies why an inductive method/logic, deductive method/logic, reduction method, functional method, philosophic method, axiomatic method, etc. are irrelevant in contemporary African philosophical discourse as the whole, with the exception of hermeneutic philosophy. Therefore, in my subsequent articles, I will thoroughly expose what I call the ACADEMIC BULLSHITS of Western and Westernized African intellectuals, which they have been propagating under the guise of academic discourse. In this way, I will attempt to equalize the hitherto unbalanced achievement of African Philosophy. But before doing so, it is best to offer a useful interpretation of African philosophy on the subsequent articles.
To begin with, it is now over six decades since the debate on the nature, problems, and methods of African philosophy had begun to emerge. The publication of La philosophie Bantoue in 1945 ― which was published in English as Bantu Philosophy in 1959 and 1969 ― has brought about strong blasts of immense changes. These changes have been manifested in the consequence of an increase in works of African and Western philosophy.
Although Oruka’s four trends, namely “Ethnophilosophy,” “Professional” Philosophy, Philosophic Sagacity, and Nationalistic-Ideological Philosophy – have been widely adopted by most African philosophers; Imbo’s identification of three approaches to African philosophy is highly recommended. (S. O. Imbo, 1998, p. 7) The main reason is that what Imbo identified as Particularist and Universalist approaches, with the exception of the hermeneutical approach, is nothing other than a reduction of Oruka’s four trends of African philosophy. [Note that hermeneutical philosophy is a philosophical approach which came to appear as a reaction against the Particularist and Universalist extreme views of philosophy] Interestingly enough, Oruka himself admits that “A deeper analysis of them [i.e. various proposals and findings on African philosophy] reveals the idea that there are generally two radically distinct senses of the usage of the expression [of African philosophy].” (O. Oruka, 1990, p. 13). [Note that this view presupposes “the truth of” Senghor’s explicit assertion that “European reasoning is analytical, discursive by utilization; and Negro-African reasoning is intuitive by participation.” (L. Senghor, 1964, p. 74)] This assertion of Oruka is very true as far as the history of African philosophy is concerned. As Karp and Masolo have correctly pointed out:
The history of African philosophy is a history of two contesting parties. The first of these parties has come to be known as ethnophilosophy, the study of collective forms of culture as manifestations of African philosophical systems. The second, now known as African philosophy, argues that philosophical practice, as a second-order critical evaluation of first-order thinking about nature, culture, and experience, must be a vital activity in Africa. (I. Karp and D. A. Masolo, 2000, p. 4)
Thus, a concise historical reflection must begin by elucidating these two schools. Thanks to the painstaking research of African philosophers and there is a very rich and diversified list of excellent publications in the area, this historical sketch need not be an exhaustive analysis of the history of African philosophy, but it will be useful to consider some pseudo epistemological assumptions deeply embedded in contemporary academic African philosophical discourse.
To begin with, the literary works of Placid Tempels (1959/1969), John Samuel Mbiti (1969), Robin Horton (1973), Marcel Griaule (1965), and Alexis Kagame (1956), among others, are all identified with the “ethnophilosophical” school. The works of L. S. Senghor (1967) and C. A. Diop (1954; 1987) also fall under the same school of thought. (Imbo, 1998, pp. 11-15, 56-60) In a strict sense, the very term “ethnophilosophy” has a pejorative connotation, which makes a total understanding of it unlikely. As Imbo has shrewdly observed:
Defining ethnophilosophy is a complicated business, if only because no African philosopher willingly admits to being called an ethnophilosopher. Indeed, the appellation “ethnophilosophy” is something of an insult, because to be an ethnophilosopher is to be seen by universalist philosophers to support to practice philosophy in a manner that deviates from the conventional. (Ibid, pp. 53-64)
Imbo’s contention should not be applied to all critics; the derogatory meaning of the term, however, is unquestionable. Yet, Odhiambo makes the cautious remark that “Those scholars and thinkers who are qualified as ethnophilosophers are so referred–to essentially because of their views regarding the nature of African philosophy or because of the methodology that they employ in their discourses on African philosophy.” (Odhiambo, 2012, p. 77)
Accordingly, the critical works of Kwasi Wiredu (1980), Paulin Hountondji (1983), Peter Bodunrin (1981; 1991), F. Eboussi-Boulaga (1968), Henry Odera Oruka (1990), and Marcien Towa (1971), among others, are all regarded as “professional” philosophy. Besides little differences, all “professional” philosophers treat the “ethnophilosophical” school as “a dangerous irrelevancy, a clinging to outmoded traditional belief systems in a modern world.” (Imbo, 1998, p. 68) Paulin Hountondji, for instance, totally rejects the view that African philosophy is unique. He explicitly states the methodological problem of the “ethnophilosophical” school and contends that “ethnophilosophy” is a system of collective thought and is spontaneous, which, in turn, is understood to mean it refers to something all the members of a given society would adhere to.
Words do indeed change their meanings miraculously as soon as they pass from the Western to the African context, and not only in the vocabulary of European or American writers but also, through faithful imitation, in that of Africans themselves. That is what happens to the word ‘philosophy’: applied to Africa, it is supposed to designate no longer the specific discipline it evokes in its Western context but merely a collective worldview, an implicit, spontaneous, perhaps even unconscious system of beliefs to which all Africans are supposed to adhere. This is a vulgar usage of the word, justified presumably by the supposed vulgarity of the geographical context to which it is applied. (Hountondji, 1991, pp. 116-117)
This assertion of Hountondji indicates that the term “philosophy” is equivocal when it qualifies “African.” What Hountondji calls myth, asserts Odhiambo, is the idea that “African philosophy is distinct from Western philosophy, with the implication that Africans are not critical thinkers, that in Africa everybody always agrees with everybody else.” (Odhiambo, 2010, p. 82) Thus, Hountondji unequivocally dismissed the “ethnophilosophical” school as “a pre-philosophy mistaking itself for metaphilosophy, a philosophy which, instead of presenting its own rational justification, shelters lazily behind the authority of a tradition and projects its own theses and beliefs on that tradition.” (Hountondji, 1991, p. 120)
Moreover, Hountondji is uncompromising in his critique of Tempels’s work, Bantu Philosophy. Here, the content and form of Tempels’ philosophical view can be subsumed in the very words of Oruka:
The position of Tempels is, of course now well known. In brief it is as follows: Africans, or specifically Bantu, have a philosophy. This philosophy has its own internal coherence. It is based on the hierarchy of “forces” with God as the top, followed by man, animals, plants and non-living objects. This line up of forces is summarized by the concept of “vital force”. This philosophy, however, is not akin to what passes in the West as “philosophy”. It is a philosophy which is the common belief and imperishable truth of everyone. Yet the Africans (Bantu) are themselves not capable of formulating or presenting a philosophical treatise. So it is the function of the outsiders (like Tempels himself) to formulate for the Bantu what their philosophy is. (Oruka, 1990)
Hountondji then dismisses such a philosophical approach in its totality and explicitly asserts that “Africans are, as usual, excluded from the discussion, and Bantu philosophy is a mere pretext for learned disquisitions among Europeans. The black man continues to be the very opposite of an interlocutor; he remains a topic, a voiceless face under private investigation, an object to be defined and not the subject of a possible discourse.” (Hountondji, 1983, p. 34)
Accordingly, he observes a dangerous ideology presented by Tempels’ theory of forces which makes a dichotomy between the “white man” and the Other. For instance, Imbo’s thorough analysis of the theory of forces shows that Tempels extracts seven principles from Bantu/Baluba practices, namely: “1. In European systems of thought, ‘being’ or ‘existence’ is the most general concept. In Bantu philosophy, the essence is force –the existence of anything is its being a force. 2. Every force is specific. 3. Different types of beings are characterized by different intensities and types of force. 4. Each force can be strengthened or weakened. 5. Because all forces are radically interdependent internally, they act on each other and influence each other. 6. The universe is a hierarchical order of forces according to their strengths. 7. Beings higher in the hierarchical order can influence all beings of lower rank directly.” (Imbo, 1998, pp. 78-79) These basic principles illustrate what Hountondji attempted to destroy in totality and dismissed as a baseless vis-à-vis a philosophical approach to an African mode of thought. On this, Messay’s philosophical view seems to fully justify Hountondji’s strong criticism of “ethnophilosophy”: “Tempels’s depiction of vital force as the cardinal concept of Bantu philosophy is responsible for the charge of otherness. The concept of vital force seems to place Africans on the opposite side of [i.e., thinking in opposition to] Western philosophy, since unlike the Western notion of a given and static object, a mysterious and active force appears to animate the African notion of being.” (Messay Kebede, 2004, p. 32)
This European project, Hountondji argues, has had the aim of demarcating African civilizations, separating them from European ones at all costs. As E. A. Ruch and K. C. Anyanwu say in interpreting Hountondji’s main contention, “African civilization has been ‘fixed and mummified’ in the traditions of the past. Thus, the European ‘ethno-philosophers’ have tried to kill the Africans’ creative power to produce philosophical ideas and debates. The African philosophers were expected to be archivists of their cultural traditions, rather than original thinkers.” (E. A. Ruch and K. C. Anyanwu,, 1984, p. 12)
After all is sorted out, Hountondji’s definition of African philosophy, sums up Odhiambo, can be encapsulated in three basic features: (a) that African philosophy consists of texts; (b) that Africans should be the ones to have written the texts; and (c) that the texts should be described as philosophical by the authors themselves or by African writers themselves. (Odhiambo, 2012, p. 85) As Masolo has correctly concluded, “Hountondji defines philosophy in two ways: first, philosophy is a discourse, a scientific discourse, a methodical inquiry with universal aims; second as history, philosophy is metaphilosophy, a philosophical reflection on philosophical discourse.” ( D. A. Masolo, 1994, p. 202)
However, Hountondji’s radical position, in turn, has never escaped severe criticism. To begin with, Masolo himself has posed the very crucial question of whether Hountondji can “be saved from this dogmatic slumber by his own quest for philosophy as history, as a dialectical progression.” (ibid) Put differently, must an African philosophy achieve the objective status of being a scientific discourse to demonstrate its own methodology? This is one of the pitfalls of Hountondji’s thinking in that “dialectical progression in philosophy does not always mean a vertical movement to progressively new points without return.” (ibid) The main reason is that the integration of the old in the new is always inevitable. Hence, the burden of proof falls on Hountondji’s shoulders either to reject or to admit Masolo’s disjunctive assertion that “either the whole history of philosophy is nothing but the history of myths, or there is no myth at all in philosophy.”
In a similar vein, Hountondji’s philosophical approach is attacked by Ruch and Anyanwu as containing oversimplifications and points causing confusion. They argue that what the former dismisses as myth cannot be accepted simply because “the myth is both less and more than philosophy.” (E. A. Ruch and K. C. Anyanwu,, 1984, p. 13) They underscore that “the starting point of any philosophy must of necessity be the common sense experiences and beliefs which are, by their very nature pre-philosophical.” (ibid)
Peter Bodunrin also dismisses Hountondji’s contention on the basis that writing is not a necessary condition for philosophy. Although Bodunrin doubts “whether philosophy can progress adequately without writing,” he, however, maintains that “writing is not a prerequisite for philosophy.” (Bodunrin, 1981, p. 177) As Odera Oruka has well stated:
To exist as a philosopher, it is not necessary that one’s thoughts must progress or be available to the future generation. Sufficient for the existence of a philosopher is that one’s contemporaries recognize one’s philosophical ability and practice. How many of the contemporary African philosophers will have their ideas known beyond their death? Many of us shall have our works buried unrecognized within the myriad of the many kinds of literature that are being produced in the field. Yet this fact would not in itself deny the point that authors of such works existed as philosophers. Lack of knowledge about one’s or a people’s philosophy is not a proof of the non-existence of such a philosophy. (Oruka, 1990, p. 53)
Without taking an extreme philosophical position, I would like to assert two critical points as far as Hountondji’s philosophical approach is concerned. First, one should underscore the reason why Hountondji himself severely criticizes “ethnophilosophers” as naïve followers of Tempels. Here, his strong reaction seems right, for Tempels has arrogantly and baselessly asserted that:
We do not claim, of course, that the Bantu are capable of formulating a philosophical treatise, complete with an adequate vocabulary. It is our job to proceed to such systematic development. It is we who will be able to tell them, in precise terms, what their inmost concept of being is. They will recognize themselves in our words and will acquiesce, saying, “you understand us: you now know us completely: you ‘know’ in the way we ‘know’ ”. (Tempels, 1959/1969, p. 36)
This is just academic bullshits! In this regard, Hountondji’s critical response is justifiable for the simple reason that such a chauvinistic intellectual approach as Temples and his followers exhibit should not be tolerated under any circumstances. To say the least, Western ethnocentrism and its irrational contempt expressed by so called “intellectuals” toward Africans, a trend which is still prevalent today, has become a barrier in African studies as a whole. Hence, African scholars need to reassess the methodological as well as the ideological bases of such deficient scholarship inherent in Western discourses on Africa.
Unquestionably, an in depth experience of the socio-political milieu of the African continent/experience is needed if one hopes to produce an effective, critical, and reflective work on any form of African philosophy, which is far from being what Hountondji himself naively asserts is universal philosophy. If it were, neither African nor Western philosophy would be unique. The reality is, rather, precisely what Imbo pointed out:
Before Hountondji can claim science, writing, and philosophy as the universals to which African should aspire, he has a duty to examine the framework within which they were previously developed in a manner that excluded the non-western World. Hountondji boldly lays claim to an equal right to literacy, science, and philosophy –but fails to acknowledge the implications of the European cultural context of their development. He fails, therefore, to examine Europe’s former usurpation of the right of ownership to these concepts. (Imbo, 1998, p. 87)
(to be continued)
Note: The responsibility for the article is entirely mine.
Galatoomaa!
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* Yoseph Mulugeta Baba received his B.A; M.A; and Ph.D. degrees in Philosophy from the CUEA. His research areas include Metaphilosophy, Oromo Philosophy, Continental Philosophy, Post-colonial African Political Philosophy, Postmodernism, and Ethiopian historiography. Currently, he is completing his forthcoming book (CUEA PRESS) — on ‘The Ilaa-fi-Ilaamee Philosophical Method of Enquiry.’ He can be reached at kankokunmalimaali@gmail.com.